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Abstract
In the spirit of Jean Baudrillard’s  Forget Foucault this article offers a step-by-step
critique of the ‘moral panic’ concept. It begins with a short review of Cohen’s original
thesis and its gradual evolution before addressing its remarkable popularity and ascent
to the stature of a domain assumption. The rest of the article uses and extends the
existing critique of moral panic theory before suggesting that the entire conceptual
repertoire,  rather  than undergo another  period of  adaptation,  should be ditched to
make way for much-needed innovation. 
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Introduction
Students  are  often  led  to  believe  that  Stanley Cohen and Jock Young created  the
concept of a ‘moral panic’ during the heady days of 1960s intellectual radicalism, a
time when criminology fundamentally redefined itself as new ideas challenged the
administrative core of the discipline. In fact, the phrase has a much longer history.
While it briefly appears in McLuhan’s (1964)  Understanding Media, Sutton (2012)
traces the earliest usage to 1831 and a critique of the French government’s habit of
enacting  military  cordons  around  Cholera-afflicted  towns,  amplifying  the  original
infection and causing unrest amongst the towns’ populations. The basic framework of
this argument is not too different from the moral panic theory we know today.
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With  the  growth  of  academic  criminology  over  the  last  few  decades,  its  native
inference has become something of an analytical mainstay in the English-speaking
world’s institutions of government, media, research and education, especially in the
study of crime and deviance. For all its ubiquity, however, the moral panic thesis was
founded on a very brief and opportunistic piece of research. In his famous study of
mods and rockers, Cohen (1972), sitting in a Brighton café, noted that the minor acts
of deviance he observed amounted to little more than the exuberant hijinks common
to gatherings of young people. Far more remarkable, he argued, was the extent to
which the media inflated,  misrepresented and sensationalised minor transgressions,
inciting public fears to feed the politics of reactionary governance and punitive social
policy.  
Although most of the attention given to this concept in the decades since has been
overwhelmingly  positive  (Jewkes,  2015),  it  has  also  attracted  dissent  from voices
arguing that its considerable prominence might be unwarranted (most recently, Hall,
2012a; Thompson & Williams, 2015). This article’s purpose is to move the existing
critique forward with the aid of some current concepts and theoretical frameworks.
We will first turn our attention to the origins and development of Cohen’s thesis
since  the  1970s,  with  an  emphasis  on  its  current  prominence  within  the
criminological literature, before segueing into a more detailed appraisal of some
of the  newer ideas  that  perhaps call  it  into  question.  In  the  process,  we will
consider the possibility that criminology should seek to move beyond the idea of
‘moral panics’ because its understanding of politics, social order and structural
change might no longer reflect the ontological and ethical constitution of late
modernity. 
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The Age of Moral Panics
The remarkable ascendency of the moral panic thesis would have been unlikely in an
early social-scientific world dominated by positivism’s domain assumption that our
ideas can and should be grounded in the observable facts that constitute social reality.
We are all familiar with the story that positivism was challenged by interpretivism,
which  followed  a  line  from  Kant  through  Weber,  the  phenomenologists  and  the
American pragmatists to Mead’s (1934) conception of the social self. Imported into
the social  sciences  by symbolic  interactionist  scholars such as Frank Tannenbaum
(1938)  and  Herbert  Blumer  (1992  [1969]),  Mead’s  ideas  provided  much  of  the
philosophical impetus behind an increasingly hard-line form of social constructionism
(Parker, 1998) that took hold during the post-war era. In the form of labelling theory
(see Becker, 1963), for instance, it acquired a degree of prominence on the ‘radical’
side of criminology, displacing conflict theory and Marxism as the main opponent of
positivism, conservative control theory and neo-classicism. 
The subsequent appeal of the moral panic thesis was very much a product of this
constructionist  framework  and  its  widespread  popularity  amongst  the  radical
intellectuals of  the 1960s and 70s (Young, 2009).  It  dovetailed perfectly  with the
wider paradigmatic shift that began to de-emphasise the aetiology of crime and the
ontology of harm in favour of an increasingly prevalent commitment to ideas such as
labelling and criminalisation as part  of  a relentless  critique of state  power,  media
discourse and social control (see Ditton, 1979; Sumner, 1994). Within this emergent
conceptual  orientation,  the  moral  panic  thesis  captured  and  reflected  the  social
scientific  zeitgeist  of  the  mid-twentieth  century,  perfectly  interlocking  with  an
increasingly prevalent  commitment  to  the liberal  pluralist  assertion that  normative
categories such as ‘crime’, ‘deviance’ and ‘harm’ have little to no ontological reality
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and are instead simply words used by legislative elites and other traditional sites of
power to demonise and scapegoat otherwise minor and insignificant transgressions. 
In turn, this increasingly ‘subdominant’ paradigm (Hall & Winlow, 2015) draped a
cloak of ecological validity over the moral panic thesis, shielding it from criticism and
allowing it  the time and space to  become one of our most widely referenced and
highly regarded analytical concepts. Its prevalence is such that, in the latest edition of
the original work, Cohen (2011a [1972]) boasted of more than one hundred citations
per year since the early 1990s, whilst Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2013), on their way to
a similarly populist affirmation, point to a range of citation indexes which, almost
uniformly, show a constant upward trend in the use of the concept between 1971 and
2009. In their estimation, 
If we take academic attention as the measure of success, the moral panic concept
has proven to be a whopping one. With each successive decade, the number of
books,  articles in the mass media and academic journals,  and citations in the
social sciences literature substantially increase (Ibid. 31-2) 
It has repeatedly been called the most influential sociological concept of the twentieth
century and even became, according to Garland (2008), a prerequisite for effective
social theorisation, to the extent that the relative contribution of newer ideas should be
assessed  on how much they accord  with  the  moral  panic  platform.  What’s  more,
unlike nearly every other concept produced by academic sociology, the idea of moral
panic has,  as Altheide (2009) notes,  ably colonised the liberal  dimension of mass
media output, especially in editorials and opinion pieces. In this context, it is used
primarily by journalists who perceive civil  liberties to be under threat from wider
media/political discourse on specific aspects of criminal justice. The successive cases
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of historic sex abuse on the heels of the Jimmy Savile scandal, for instance, provide a
salutary example of just how readily sections of the British media reach for the moral
panic thesis’s customary conclusions (see, for instance, Cree, 2012). Cohen’s thesis,
we might argue, ‘seems to have found its way into the common lexicon as an abstract
but apparently naturalistic description of social life that is constantly recycled with
every new turn of criminal justice discourse’ (Horsley, 2014: 91). Thompson (1998: 1)
even goes so far as to describe the recent history of criminology as the ‘age of the
moral panic’. 
Despite its apparent popularity, however, the moral panic thesis has been subject to
almost  constant  debate  over  the  last  forty  years  or  so,  producing  successive
conceptual debates (see Hall et al, 1978; Waddington, 1986; Goode & Ben Yehuda,
1994;  Kidd-Hewitt  & Osborne,  1995; McRobbie & Thornton,  1995; Ungar,  2001;
Waiton, 2008; Klocke & Muschert, 2010) and a growing volume of published work –
according to the Web of Science citation index, the decade between 2000 and 2009
produced 143 directly relevant articles whilst 2010 to early 2017 has already produced
161 – all of which strengthens an affirmative, defensive fortification that repeatedly
deflects  any attempt to  gain access  to  the thesis’s  core  assumptions.  When social
scientists  of various stripes review Cohen’s ideas, for instance,  it  almost seems to
have become standard practice to flag up an overlapping list of concerns that appear
across  the  relevant  literature  without  noticeably  affecting  the  thesis’s  ultimate
sustainability  (see,  for  example,  Garland,  2008;  David  et  al,  2011;  Cohen,  2011a
[1972]; 2011b; Jewkes, 2015). 
The critical literature frequently reminds us that perhaps the original definition might
have been a bit on the vague side, or that subsequent updates have often steadfastly
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refused to  define their  terms.  Some critics  suggest  that  it  patronises audiences  by
assuming  their  gullibility  to  the  underhand  ideological  machinations  of  nefarious
elites, even to the extent that it could be located in the widely condemned stable of
‘conspiracy  theory’.  Others  that  it  offers  a  particularly  rigid  and  formulaic
understanding  of  social  interaction  that  perhaps  deprives  affected  parties  of  their
subjectivity.  It  also  might  overstate  the  prevalence  of  active  ‘panic’ amongst  the
population whilst, conversely, underestimating the apathy and cynicism of the general
population.  Finally,  there is  a longstanding question around the sheer difficulty of
judging  or  measuring  the  proportionality  of  reactions  to  perceived  or  real  social
problems. In all, the critique has been mounting up for decades but the over-riding
tendency seems to be to defensively acknowledge, dismiss and carry on as before
rather than reconsider the viability of the concept itself.
Despite this ongoing debate, however, the remarkably resilient concepts that underlie
the moral panic thesis have not changed too much. The production of a ‘moral panic’
can still be broken down into three interlocking and overlapping phases. In the first
instance, the mass media and political elites identify a subject ripe for ‘folk devil’
status and engage in a process of negative symbolisation that uses emotive language,
rumour  and  outright  falsehood  to  sensationalise  selected  phenomena  that  indicate
crime or deviance, usually of a minor nature. ‘The powerful’ then use these symbols
of evil to warn the public that some subcultural lifestyle poses an ongoing threat to the
dominant social values that hold society together and prevent a collapse into chaos.
This creates a fearful public mood in which the further erosion of civil liberties and
the expansion of social control can be more easily justified.  
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In other  words,  the moral  panic thesis,  as  Jewkes (2015:  93) argues,  has  perhaps
‘become  fixed  within  a  pattern  of  enquiry  which  frequently  relies  on  ‘ritualistic
reproductions’  or  misrepresentations  of  Cohen’s  original  conceptualization’  that
encourage  ‘a  fawning…  adherence  to  its  theoretical  premises’.  The  breadth  of
research  arguing  that  the  popular  representation  of  some  phenomenon  is  merely
another attempt to create  a moral  panic and is  thus probably not  worth too much
social-scientific investigation into its generative mechanisms or associated harms is
really quite remarkable. It includes everything from rioting youth (Nijjar, 2015) and
illegal  drugs  (Weidner,  2009;  Linnemann,  2010),  through  paedophilia,  child
protection  (Cavanagh,  2007;  Clapton  et  al,  2013),  single  mothers  and  teenage
pregnancy (Heilborn,  2007;  Azjenstadt,  2009)  to  issues  like  immigration  (Pijpers,
2006; Meyer, 2016) and terrorism (Rothe & Muzatti, 2004; Bonn, 2010). 
However, a gathering chorus of voices is now claiming that, without returning to the
prejudiced, indiscriminate and politically dangerous pathologization of the past, the
‘age of the moral panic’ should perhaps come to a close. We will now begin to explore
this claim with a discussion of moral panic’s conceptual foundations.
 ‘Conservative’ Moral Order
The idea of a moral panic, suggests Jewkes (2015), rests on a concept of social order
that has remained largely unchanged since the 1970s. Its assertion that elites promote
a perspective on threats to social order to reinforce the necessity of control and the
sanctity  of  moral  boundaries,  however,  has  roots  that  extend  back  into  an  early
twentieth  century  critique  of  modernist  universalism.  A close  examination  of  the
extant thesis, for instance, might reveal traces of Durkheim’s conscience collective –
broadly  consensual  shared  morality  –  shifted  into  a  pluralist  register  by  an
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interactionist understanding of social identity that transposes functional collectivity
into a ‘conservative’ capacity for repressive control.  Such notions of ‘control’ and
‘repression’ come from a different time, a ‘classical age’ (Baudrillard, 2007: 30), in
which pluralism was a new and exciting idea and relative constraint had yet to make
way  for  an  increasingly  ‘tolerant’ and  ‘respectful’ approach  to  marginal  cultural
differences.   If  that’s  the case,  however,  the critical  scholar might be forgiven for
questioning the sustainability of notions of control and repression in a society that has
since gone a long way toward adopting a more pluralist disposition.
Within the existing critique, the idea that the moral panic thesis, amongst a suite of
cognate  ideas,  might  seem  to  have  ‘stopped  the  clock’  on  certain  aspects  of
criminological theory is not uncommon. It perhaps does not reflect a changing media
landscape in which, even prior to 24-hour rolling coverage, popular internet access
and social media, there was no single source of information and any one perspective,
even that of ‘elites’, could easily get lost amongst the noise (McRobbie and Thornton,
1995).  In  Hunt’s  (2003)  estimation,  cultural  boundaries  between  morality  and
immorality  have  become  increasingly  permeable,  to  the  extent  that  the  locus  of
moralisation  has  shifted  from  a  vague  threat  to  ‘core’  values  toward  shifting
hybridisations  of  risk  and  harm  that  are  often  considerably  more  diffuse  and
ephemeral than classic notions of elite influence. Meanwhile, Ungar (2001: 277) notes
that  ‘[r]isk society issues  do not  generally  fit  a  top  down model’ and are instead
catalysed by real world events, giving direction to single-issue campaign groups that
purport to resist but often only ‘express solidarity’ with popular concerns. 
Faced  with  such  criticism,  however,  some  of  the  more  prominent  moral  panic
theorists have begun something of a rear-guard action by broadening the concept to
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maintain  its  viability.  In  acknowledging  the  differences  between  1960s  moral
regulation and that of the 21st century, for instance, Cohen (2011a [1972]) offers a
latter-day  reformulation,  which  ditches  any  trace  of  specificity  in  favour  of
neutralising critique by generalising and diffusing the concept. Within this newfound
openness, ‘moral entrepreneurs’ no longer have to be members of a ‘powerful’ class,
they  can  instead  be  just  about  anyone  including  ‘subcultures’,  academics  and
minorities; accordingly, panics no longer have to bolster the status quo, they can also
be used to shore up the kind of ‘subordinate moralities’ that would once have been the
unequivocal ‘victims’ in the classic scenario; and, finally, panics can now be ‘good’ –
supportive of social diversity – rather than always ‘bad’ or ‘conservative’. 
In this way, Cohen tried to adapt the concept to its shifting social context but, in the
process, turned what had been a reasonably specific idea into an indiscriminate, all-
purpose  designation  for  a  broad array  of  popular  third-party  influences  on  public
concern.  While  acknowledging  that  criminology’s  purview usually  takes  it  in  the
direction  of  ‘bad’  panics  –  those  fitting  the  traditional  definition  –  Cohen’s
increasingly promiscuous use of the concept has begun to generate dissent of its own. 
If the moral panic thesis needs to keep abreast of social change, suggests Critcher
(2008; 2009; 2011), it  would be better  to stay as close as possible to the original
formulation by perhaps broadening the concept only slightly to designate an active
process of ‘moral regulation’ that can occasionally tip over into a full-blown panic.
What he appears to mean is that although social context probably has shifted around
the moral panic thesis, there are still processes by which elites seek to regulate and
control the beliefs, aspirations and values of the general population, which should be
analysed along three axes of social construction: 
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[T]he perceived threat to moral order posed by an issue, the extent to which it is
seen to be amenable to social control and how far it invites ethical self-formation
(Critcher, 2009: 31) 
With this in mind, he suggests, a ‘moral panic’ should be seen as an extreme form of a
more general process by which elites maintain a kind of top-down control through the
determined and purposeful manipulation of public concern. In a very similar vein,
Hier (2008: 186; see also 2002) argues that risk society’s increased harm-awareness
fosters  a  proliferation  of  ‘moralizing  discourses…  rationally  oriented  toward
governing oneself and others’, leading into a form of social control as they ‘link up
with pre-existing or emergent themes of risk’ (Hier et al, 2011: 272) so as to promote
‘long-term political and moral projects’. Underlying all this talk of ‘moral regulation’,
‘moral order’ and ‘processes of moralisation’,  however,  is the clear assertion that,
although core social mores might have become rather more difficult to pin down in
recent decades, there remains a subset of ‘distinctive issues’ that, depending on how
they fit into the above axes, might, at any point, generate enough friction or conflict
within  or  between  sections  of  the  population  to  detonate  a  classic  moral  panic
(Critcher, 2009). 
In  either  case,  however,  it  might  seem as  though  the  moral  panic  thesis  remains
trapped within a language of power that no longer reflects the social structures and
relations  it  is  supposed to  explain.  Its  temporal  and philosophical  origins  date  its
founding assumptions to a time before the rise of ‘postmodernism’ and the super-
determining influence of social and economic liberalism over the last half century. It
skips over the suggestion that we no longer live under a relatively monolithic ethical
order that seeks to funnel and prohibit self-expression and thus misses the possibility
that  current  structures  rely  less  on  overt  forms  of  ‘control’ and  far  more  on  the
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liberation  of  minimally-controlled  organic  desire  as  a  vehicle  for  the  continued
circulation of capital (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005). 
Where traditional social-scientific theories like moral panic generally rely on a zero-
sum concept of social order, any such apparatus of ‘control’ has since made way for a
dualistic, non-zero-sum process of stimulation and pacification that expends as much
time and effort stimulating and releasing libidinal forces – ambition, competition and
the pursuit of individualised desires – as it does desperately trying to keep a lid on
them. It’s the dynamic tension between the two, rather than anything that might be
called ‘moral  regulation’,  that  allows for  the maintenance of  social  structure as it
currently stands because their oscillating action adds up to the energetic generation of
pseudo-pacified  socio-symbolic  competition,  which  makes  full  use  of  the
individualised pursuit of lifestyle as the driving force behind post-industrial capitalism
(Hall, 2012a). 
It’s  here  that  Cohen’s  thesis  really  begins  to  set  itself  apart  from the  ontological
foundations  of  current  social  structures  because  the  repeated  assertion  that  minor
stylistic  difference  presents  a  ‘non-conformist’  threat  to  dominant  social  values
fundamentally  sidesteps  the  social  transformations  that  have  successfully  installed
libidinal drives at the heart of our political-economic system (McGowan, 2016). It
thus  misses  the  logical  suggestion  that  ‘crime’ and ‘harm’ might  result  less  from
people pushing against a system that constraints them, than from a kind of ‘hyper-
conformity’ to  the  primary  ethical  values  of  late  capitalism  and  the  fundamental
disorder  of  multitudinous  individualised  passions  eager  for  satisfaction  (see,  for
instance, Briggs, 2013; Raymen & Smith, 2015). 
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In  this  context,  centralised  power  does  not  ‘control’  the  general  population  by
promoting ‘moralising discourses’ so much as struggle to maintain relevance amid the
sheer  variety  of  drives  and  desires.  It  thus  stages  its  own retreat  into  a  kind  of
populist, lowest-common-denominator technocratic stewardship in which it constructs
and maintains  influence only to the extent  that it  is  ‘capable of making itself  the
guarantor of ‘petty pleasures’’ (Rancière, 2006: 31). What this does, however, is to
effectively neutralise the kind of symbolic authority that is the ultimate object of the
moral panic thesis  as it  continually rehearses the suggestion that  elites pursue the
active generation of fear to create space for a barely perceptible drift toward iron-
fisted control. 
Where  theories  of  social  reaction  generally  identify  unidirectional,  monolithic
attempts at ‘control’, current ideas point to a ‘post-political’ phase of history in which
collectivist rule-bound order has given way to clamorous demands for ‘acceptance’,
‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’ in relation to individualised ‘lifestyle choices’ (see Winlow &
Hall, 2012). The kind of statist power that purposely regulates the finance industry to
allow people to  live beyond their  means  whilst  actively  promoting policy  change
toward  the  erosion  of  restrictive  legislation  –  recent  provisions  for  homosexual
marriage, for example – does not look like a body with tight moralistic control over
what people do and think, let alone a hand in anything that could be called ‘moral
regulation’.  Indeed,  it  often  seems  as  if  the  neoliberal  state  might  be  better
characterised as a variant of the classical liberal ‘night-watchman state’. A state that
intervenes heavily during periodic financial crises yet normally remains a target of
vilification for the dominant neoliberal right and sub-dominant liberal left (see Hall &
Winlow, 2015), patently hates itself and wants to minimise its role in social life in a
cost-effective way that will satisfy ‘taxpayers’. 
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Placed alongside such contemporary ideas, the moral panic thesis arguably remains
trapped within an increasingly anachronistic critique of a no-longer-existing form of
socio-political regulation. It rails against a form of ‘moral order’ that perhaps, during
the middle decades of last century, might have expressed a degree of antipathy toward
some of the ‘cultural freedoms’ that we now take for granted but which have now
been  sanctified  within  a  political-economic  framework  that  solicits  as  well  as
represses  the  organic  expression  of  individualised  desire  in  aid  of  its  continuing
attempts to force round the endless circulation of capital (Baudrillard, 2007). 
In other words, the moral panic thesis perhaps operates within a rather agoraphobic
appreciation of social  ontology that relies on an endlessly re-circulated critique of
prohibitive  morality  straight  out  of  the  1960s,  which  only  maintains  viability  by
resolutely  ignoring  recent  transformations  in  twenty-first  century  socio-political
thought and practice. The suggestion that ideational conflict on a bed of top-down
moral regulation occasionally tips over into full blown panic might seem to fly in the
face of the era of ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher, 2009) in which any irreducible sense of
good and right seems to have been supplanted by pragmatic economic rationality and
political acceptance. Even the most destructive events seemingly attract only transient
flurries  of  media  attention  before  slotting  neatly  into  the  prevailing  narrative  of
balanced budgets, fiscal responsibility and the absence of political alternatives. All of
which leads to a rather important question.
Order and Disorder
If  the  moral  panic  thesis  struggles  to  reflect  current  socio-political  structures  and
relations  of  power,  why  does  it  remain  one  of  our  most  popular  and  frequently
referenced concepts? The beginnings of an answer, we might suggest, can be found
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within  criminology’s  slightly  uncomfortable  position  at  the  frontier  of  ethical
condemnation,  from  which  it  would  be  all  too  easy  to  slip  back  into  the
pathologization  of  otherness  that  played  such  a  prominent  role  in  the  twentieth
century’s many totalitarian atrocities. Where the social sciences might once have been
driven by a desire  to enable individuals and groups to  achieve their  full  potential
through the pursuit of nurturing and supportive social relations (see Adorno, 1967),
any such transformative impulse has since been stripped away by previous attempts to
improve the human condition. Terrified of further social and biological engineering,
the social sciences have instead been energised and confined by a catastrophist fear of
the ‘barbarism of order’ – a shorthand designation for the consequences of overly
centralised power (see Hall, 2012b) – that has since artificially foreshortened their
intellectual horizon by de-emphasising the analysis of social systems and the human
condition in favour protecting the individual from collective power.
While  this  shift  was probably unavoidable given the historical  context,  it  perhaps
offers  us a window in to  the continuing appeal  of  Cohen’s  thesis,  which,  suggest
Thompson and Williams (2015), furnishes its primary agents with a means to defend
and  project  post-political  pragmatism by  concealing  the  liberal  left’s  fundamental
catastrophism behind the rather more jovial, approachable assertion that ‘it’s all just a
moral panic’. What this actually does, however, is to shield the ‘progressive’ self-
perception  of  the  technicist,  administrative  middle  class  from  any  meaningful
encounter  with the grubby,  toxic  realities  of  the neoliberal  era,  which,  by way of
consequence,  also  allows  them  to  cheerily  dismiss  alternative  truth  claims  as
mediated, politicised fictions that will only erode hard-won freedoms (Hall, 2012b). 
14
While it would be difficult to claim that every perceived problem is pregnant with an
alternative truth-in-waiting, deployment of the moral panic thesis often runs the risk
of straying into obscurantist territory. When public concerns around the housing and
monitoring of convicted sex offenders in the UK came to a head after the abduction
and  murder  of  Sarah  Payne,  for  instance,  the  resultant  protests  seem  to  have
engendered  a  notably  dismissive  criminological  commentary  that  perpetuated
mediated myths of looting,  riots and firebombs whilst decrying protestors’ lack of
deference  to  the  criminal  justice  system  and  its  apparently  dysfunctional,  under-
resourced monitoring systems (see Hughes & Edwards, 2002; Silverman & Wilson,
2002). 
The assertion that a moral panic is in progress has the potential to take on a rather
patrician hue in which those said to be panicking are portrayed to be little more than
‘atavistic  primitives’ (Thompson  &  Williams,  2015:  277)  lacking  the  necessary
sophistication for appropriately liberal conclusions. We might even suggest that some
uses of the moral panic thesis may be more indicative of genteel distaste for certain
sections of the population – in Cohen’s (2011a [1972]: xxxiii) terms, it evokes images
of  ‘the  frenzied… mob:  atavistic,  driven  by… delirium,  susceptible  to  control  by
demagogues and… controlling others by ‘mob rule’’ – than any form of sustained
social-scientific analysis of the very real problems that afflict our lives.
It’s even possible that the thesis functions as a kind of ‘liberal conservatism’ (Žižek,
2010) by disavowing the transformational potential of intransigent social problems in
favour of a reassuring refrain – ‘don’t worry, there’s nothing to see here, everything
will be fine, it’s all just a moral panic’ – rooted in the catastrophism of the liberal left
and bourgeois disdain for the idea of a populist multitude with strong leadership and a
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sense of purpose.  Employing such ideas  to  neutralise  or negate the ‘barbarism of
order’,  however,  leaves  the  back  door  open  for  the  ‘barbarism of  disorder’ as  a
consequence of capitalism’s strategies for eliciting and harnessing powerful libidinal
energy to the myriad necessities of capital circulation. 
Within the energetic tension between between the endlessly saccharine, winner-take-
all allure of consumer solipsism and an increasingly polarised social order typified by
zero-hour contracts, unregulated shadow economies and the perceived resistance of
fantasised nationalisms (see Winlow et al, 2015), we have created an opening for the
dark  side  of  liberal  individualism – it’s  tendency to  excuse  us  from socio-ethical
responsibility on favour of the material-symbolic elevation of the self. In turn, this
‘dark  side’ feeds  into  the  appearance  of  crime  and  harm  throughout  the  social
structure, which perhaps suggests a more complex, multi-faceted analysis than the
repeated assertion that we are controlled by the overblown representation of problems,
which,  by  leading  us  to  ‘panic’,  expands  an  authoritarian  apparatus  further  into
everyday life. It’s to the prevalence and function of this social reaction that we now
turn our attention.
The Absence of ‘Panic’
In  some ways,  the  constructionist  account  at  the  heart  of  the  moral  panic  thesis
presents us with a number of really quite useful ideas that promise to protect hard-
won social freedoms, civil liberties and human rights. It contributes to the protection
of demonised others, attempts to build a degree of solidarity against the disintegrative,
factious forces of ‘divide and rule’ politics and its proponents certainly seem to see it
acting as a bulwark against new forms of authoritarianism. It does so, however, by
recirculating  a  mid-twentieth  century  iteration  of  left-liberalism’s  rather  more
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longstanding  ‘politics  of  fear’ theme  (see,  for  instance,  Garland,  2001)  in  which
‘power’ protects its interests by cultivating perceptions of danger and threat only to
ably  respond  to  demands  for  increased  security  as  if  they  were  the  outcome  of
legitimate concerns (see Tilly, 1985; Hall, 2012a). 
If  we  turn  away  from  this  prevailing  account,  however,  we  might  consider  the
possibility that confining criminological analysis to a model of social change based on
mediated representation,  apparently at  the expense  of  other  forces,  offers  a  rather
idealistic, monotone appreciation of crime and harm that perhaps goes a long way
toward sanitising and simplifying real processes and their often toxic consequences. 
Where the forces that  mould our  social  form are often diverse and unpredictable,
bound up with political economy and cultural contingency, the ‘moral panic’ thesis
keeps returning to the suggestion that western society is founded on little more than a
sophisticated,  naturalised  and  duplicitous  protection  racket.  This  seems  to  have
marginalised other crucial aspects of criminological science, particularly the idea of
destructive socio-structural drives and desires welling up organically in the context set
by neoliberalism. In other words, its analytical paradigm perpetually neglects Arendt’s
(1963) crucial distinction between ‘authority’ and ‘domination’ – consensual and non-
consensual power – to offer a somewhat conspiratorial narrative, which struggles to
countenance the possibility that the voting population might, without being duped into
it, find some use value for a touch of regulatory intervention.
Within a volatile social context afflicted by any number of distinct but interconnected
social,  political  and  economic  problems  –  unregulated,  entrepreneurial  shadow
economies  (Nordstrom,  2007);  normalisation  of  interpersonal  violence  in
marginalised  urbane  locales  (Ellis,  2016);  erosion  of  life-stage  transitions  (Lloyd,
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2013; Smith, 2014); proliferation of online criminality (Hall & Antonopoulos, 2016;
Nordstrom & Carlson, 2014); political elites that genuinely have fallen in step with
the  needs  of  capital  accumulation  (Galbraith,  2008);  debt-saturated  national
economies (Horsley, 2015); and socially destructive but deeply profitable organised
and corporate  criminality (Tombs & Whyte,  2015) – it  is  perhaps not beyond the
realms  of  possibility  that  the  determined  exercise  of  legitimate  authority  holds  a
certain  appeal  against  our  current  crisis  of  regulation  rooted  in  the  internal
contradictions and convulsions of global capitalism. 
While it would be difficult to pretend that all of the above would be an easy fit for
criminology, there seems to be a tendency to disavow knowledge, to throw concerns
over our collective shoulder in de facto defence of the status quo instead of treating
them as  potential  products  of  everyday  experience  and  critical  reflection.  What’s
missing from the moral  panic thesis,  we might  suggest,  is  an approach to  critical
enquiry  that  proceeds  from the  expression  of  concern  to  an  underlying  realm  of
‘generative mechanisms’ – underlying structural  forces  (see Bhaskar,  2008) – that
might actually help explain why, for instance, people and groups pursue interests in
ways that intrude upon and cause harm to the lives of others.
With their apparent preference for constructionist analysis, the social sciences might
even appear,  note Hall  and Winlow (2015: 99), to be ‘ignoring and glossing over
underlying structural forces… and their influence on the events that shape our lives…
restrict[ing] itself to symptomology rather than aetiology [original emphasis]’. Before
his  death,  for  example,  Cohen  (2011b:  242)  turned  his  thesis  to  a  discussion  of
international discourse on climate change, arguing that its representation can be seen
as another iteration of ‘reality instruction’ ‘too extreme to be taken seriously by the
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sociology of moral panics’ because it  ‘demand[s] a monopoly on what constitutes
‘ethical living’’. In the process, however, he might seem to have given us a window
into the thesis’s inner workings by demonstrating just how easy it is to dismiss evident
problems  by  immediately  assuming  and  declaring  them  to  be  overblown  and
misrepresented  in  a  way  that  partially  precludes  the  possibility  of  explanatory
elaboration and ameliorative action. 
The  consequent  absence  of  ‘generative  mechanisms’ from left-liberal  criminology
arguably plays directly into the hands of the neoliberal right who remain only too
happy to fill the vacuum with their preferred ideas. In resolutely turning the critical
gaze away from the idea of underlying structural causes, the incessant restriction of
analysis  to  social  reaction  leaves  the  art  of  explanation  to  become  a  hostage  to
fortune,  often  captured  by conceptual  narratives  that  deny  the  very  possibility  of
structural causation. Without competing explanatory frameworks, for instance, those
seeking to produce meaningful, effective interventions are often left with little but
neo-classical rational choice and routine activities theories, which, we might suggest,
consequently acquire far more weight than if they were they perpetually competing
for attention with ideas of greater intellectual calibre. 
In this context, Raymen (2015: 2, 15; see also Hayward, 2004) argues, the pursuit of
‘defensible space’ through situational crime prevention has become one of the more
prominent  weapons  in  the  armoury  of  the  criminal  justice  system  but,  as  a
consequence  of  its  untrammelled  adherence  to  the  rational  actor  model,  ‘actively
create[s]  urban  environments  which  perpetuate  and  exacerbate…  competitive-
individualist  and  asocial  subjectivities’  by  ‘discourag[ing]  pro-social  public
engagement’ in favour of constant movement and greater throughput of people. While
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it would be churlish to suggest that the appeal of such ideas can be directly traced to
the  predominance  to  the  moral  panic  thesis,  their  rapid  ascent  to  the  status  of
administrative orthodoxy has arguably been, at least in part, an outcome of filling the
explanatory vacuum left by ‘critical criminology’s’ retreat into the restrictive ex post
facto field of social reaction, criminalisation, panic and labelling.  
For all that, the near constant recirculation of left-liberalism’s ‘politics of fear’ theme
leads  us  to  another  important  question.  Why  would  an  all  but  unchallenged
economically neoliberal and culturally permissive elite wish the general population to
repeatedly become fearful enough to ‘panic’?  If the system’s object is, as moral panic
suggests,  a  kind  of  active  political  regression  in  the  direction  of  a  prevailing
conservatism, surely stirring up ‘fear’ and ‘panic’ would be an extraordinarily high-
risk tactic  that  might  inspire  the  wrong kind of  transformative impulse  by giving
people just enough information to identify the deep structural objects of their fears
and so delegitimize the existing order (see Hall, 2012a).
With the decline of symbolic authority, however, any such objective problems persist
without reference to ‘approved or autonomous collective symbolism’ (Ibid. 369) and
so  remain  ideologically  isolated,  separated  from  the  wider  social  field  by  the
pragmatic  administrators  of  post-political  late  modernity.  In  the  absence  of  an
engaging, seductive narrative capable of connecting subject to object  and offering
effective,  transformative  solutions,  social  problems  are  either  enveloped  by  the
neoliberal right’s ideological inertia (Fisher, 2009) or individualised and dismissed as
matters of interpretation by the constructivist pluralism of the liberal left. In either
case, the outcome is the same. Social ills get captured and neutralised by existing
narratives long before they become politically transformative. 
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If  we  could  make  that  connection  between  subjective  experience  and  underlying
structural forces, it’s entirely possible that a proliferation of social concern might hold
out a promise of transformation – constructive or destructive – but the moral panic
thesis often works to break that chain. It pulls in the opposite direction because its
constructivist worldview, driven by a catastrophist fear of the barbarism of order (see
Hall, 2012b) and the resultant form of ‘liberal conservatism’, seeks instead to separate
subject  from  object  by  artificially  inserting  the  putative  influence  of  symbolic
interactionism’s ‘significant others’, which then functions to delegitimise expressed
concern by locating its energetic impulse firmly within another subject, leaving neo-
classical ideas to occupy the field of explanation.  
Public reactions to negative experience consequently struggle to transcend low-level
frustration  and  are  more  likely  to  solicit  or  consent  to  repressive  administrative
solutions  because,  as  Jameson  (1992)  suggests,  the  relative  absence  of  critical
ideological concepts from public discourse effectively prevents the collective drawing
of ‘cognitive maps’ that would allow us to ‘locate the experience of [our] situation
within  a  meaningful  whole’ (Žižek,  2016:  39).  We  might  even  begin  to  see  the
‘politics of fear’ concept as a case of mistaken identity in which we could perhaps
usefully reconceptualise ‘panic’ as a form of ‘objectless anxiety’ that allows for the
maintenance  of  a  functionally  energetic  but  politically  neutralised  undercurrent  of
vague, unsymbolized apprehension (Hall, 2012a).
Energised by competitive individualism and prone to instability, neoliberal capitalism
provides  the  perfect  growth  medium  for  a  loose,  unfocused  sense  of  impending
personal disaster, which, because it remains unconnected to deep structural roots, only
very rarely develops beyond obdurate disquieting suspicion. While the core of the
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moral panic thesis  and its  natural  counterpoint  – either  public fears are  irrational,
ideologically constructed for political purposes and not to be taken seriously, or they
are rational, grounded in reality and in need of intervention by the criminal justice
system – might seem to dance around this idea, they are perhaps hampered by a form
of dualistic  essentialism that prevents  them from getting any closer  to the inertial
aspect of mediated discourse. 
Although governments and news media almost certainly misrepresent certain things
for political ends (see, for example, Curran & Seaton, 2009), it’s often difficult to find
much trace of a transformative function. Where the moral panic thesis often points to
the active cultivation of ‘fear’ and ‘panic’, media discourse might otherwise work to
maintain a kind of homeostatic equilibrium in the sweet spot between baseline anxiety
– which, in the form of interpersonal competition, remains economically productive
and politically distractive – and the possibility that public sentiment could,  at  any
moment,  tip  over  into  a  transcendent  moment,  breathing  life  into  the  currently
dormant demand for transformative politics. 
Simply put, media representation might seem to derive its primary impetus from a
kind of negativistic inertia in which crime stories, whether fictional or factual, rather
than portray on ongoing threat, most frequently end with a comforting resolution that
restores social order by showing the criminal justice system successfully fulfilling its
public function (Hall, 2012a; see also Silverstone, 1994). It seeks neither to inculcate
fear nor appraise the causes of crime in a measured and purposeful way but, with
reference  to  whatever  concern  might  currently  be  prickling  our  de-politicised
subjectivity,  to  illustrate  the  responsiveness  of  currently  existing  management
processes. This permanent drama of heinous crimes and successful solutions allows us
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to  persist  in  a  normal  condition of anxious complacency,  constantly suspicious  of
wrongdoing  but  ultimately  protected  by  the  pragmatic  agency  of  post-political
authority. 
Reiner (2010) makes a similar point in relation to the police and their interactions
with news media. He rejects the relatively simplistic assertion that the latter’s goal,
despite wholeheartedly reporting a variety of malfeasance, is a critique that apprises
the population of problems. Instead, he argues, media reportage actually forms one
side of a dualistic ‘scandal and reform narrative’ in  which representation flags up
successive ‘scandals’ not to create ‘panic’ but to show them being surmounted by
surface ‘reform’ so that the underlying structure can maintain a degree of internal
homeostasis.  It’s  almost  as  if  media  sensationalism  elicits  minor  concern  around
specific individualised problems only as a prelude to overstating existing institutional
capacity  to  protect  the  public  and  affect  positive  incremental  change  without
disturbing fundamental structures and processes. In the absence of this homeostatic
impulse, the moral panic thesis keeps insisting that individual and group subjectivity
is repeatedly overwhelmed by different shades of the folk devil metaphor, allowing
mediated ideas to somehow bypass direct experience and critical reflection to inspire
active political participation, which might seem to be missing something important
about the disaffected character of our current social context.
What’s missing here is the extent to which our social order has been enveloped by the
ideological inertia of ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher, 2009) and its insistence that, despite
the  mounting  symptomology of  social  decay,  there  is  no  viable  alternative  to  the
existing socioeconomic system. We now live, it often appears, in flat, world-weary,
post-political  times,  assailed  from  all  sides  by  advanced  capitalism’s  hyper-
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solicitation of desire, which, suggests Stiegler (2013: 88), saturates and congests our
reflective and decision making capacities, diverting us from the social ‘exclusively
towards  objects  of  consumption… provoking  indifference… [and]  general  apathy
overlaid  with  a  sense  of  threat’.  With  its  connotations  of  extreme,  transformative
dissatisfaction,  the idea of ‘panic’ perhaps fails  to  capture the prevailing ethos  of
interpassive ennui indicated by the appearance of depressive hedonia (Fisher, 2009),
cynical disaffection (Stiegler, 2013) and passive nihilism (Diken, 2009) throughout
the social body, all of which, in one way or another, suggest withdrawal rather than
the active moral and political engagement Cohen’s thesis ultimately relies upon. 
Within this conceptual apparatus, the ultimate function of mediated representation is
to induct social problems into the cynical, pragmatic process of fetishistic disavowal
(Žižek,  2008),  which  acknowledges  their  presence  only  to  circumnavigate  their
traumatic effects so that nothing – in terms of underlying structures – actually needs
to change. We might not understand the causes of social ills but their representation
informs us of the prevailing order’s response, ensuring that each of our society’s ‘little
evils’ merges  into  the  white  noise  of  our  normalised  background  anxiety.  It  thus
becomes very difficult to establish a potentially transformative attachment to the deep
structural  objects  of  fear  found  in  liberal  capitalism’s  internal  contradictions  and
convulsions,  which  consequently  remain  ‘unknown  consequence[s]  of  unknown
objects  and actions  embedded in unknown structures and processes’ (Hall,  2012a:
135).  
A Thesis Out of Time
Faced with these newer ideas, it’s often difficult to avoid the suggestion that the moral
panic thesis might seem to have sidestepped certain aspects of contemporary social
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theory  in  favour  of  an  increasingly obsolete  analysis  of  a  monolithic  social  order
defined by censorious ‘conservative’ ideals and propelled by politically active ‘panic’.
Fifty  years  ago,  with  much  of  the  early  discipline  mired  in  Durkheimian  social
conservatism and positivism’s mechanistic theories of causation, constructionist ideas
provided  a  vital  counterpoint  against  a  culture  of  casual  pathologisation.  Today,
however,  ‘moral panic’ is a thesis  out of time, an intervallic idea that entered the
discipline at a brief changing of the guard between the end of one paradigm and the
birth of another. 
What it might represent, in other words, is a nostalgic invocation of a modernist world
in  which  ideology  operated  positively  to  construct  belief.  In  the  neoliberal  era,
however, we have sunk into a debilitating, cynical ethos of interpassive ennui (Taylor,
2013),  which  reproduces  the  ideological  inertia  of  ‘capitalist  realism’ through  the
construction and maintenance of disbelief in the ability of politics, authoritarian or
otherwise, to organise the socio-economic world (Fisher, 2009). As a result it might
now be unnecessary or even impossible to induce politically active ‘panic’ in order to
maintain the status quo. 
In the wake of the 2016 EU referendum, for instance,  one of the more prominent
explanations  for  the  seemingly  unexpected  result,  at  least  amongst  commentators
loosely aligned with the liberal left, pointed a combination of racism, poor education
and political/media narratives that had succeeded in turning immigrants into a new
folk devil (see Pilger, 2016; Winlow et al, 2017). Although it’s probably inevitable
that prejudice plays some role in a national vote, turning it into a primary explanation
perhaps struggles to accommodate a sense of reason and logic within an opposing
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worldview,  divesting  a  diverse  swath  of  ‘leave’ voters  of  the  capacity  for  critical
reflection on the strength of their everyday experience in neoliberal reality. 
It  also leaves very little space for an acknowledgment that much of contemporary
liberal  democracy  hinges  not  on  active  political  engagement  but  on  apathy  and
disaffection to the extents that the number of absent voters regularly and significantly
exceeds victory margins. In June 2016, for example, the ‘leave’ camp won with 51.9
percent of the vote – 17.4 million versus 16.1 million, a margin of 1.3 million – but
with  a  turnout  of  just  over  72 percent,  the  referendum was surely  decided by 13
million disaffected no shows, to say nothing of unregistered voters (also probably in
the millions). Even this is higher than the usual turnout in local and general elections.
In the United States, the electoral situation is skewed even further in favour of cynical
disinterest. Voter turnout for the 2016 presidential election, despite a rather fractious
process, seems to have fallen as far as 56 percent. Nearly half of the eligible voting
population seem to have found little of value in any of the candidates.  
In this context, it’s certainly possible to accuse Donald Trump of turning ‘moral panic’
in to an electoral strategy by using ‘threatening images of the “dangerous classes”…
[to]  wantonly  illustrate  the  common  sense  behind…  ultra-conservative  solutions’
(Brotherton, 2017). It’s even inevitable that this goes some way toward explaining
Trump’s  adoption  of  highly  racialized  images  of  Mexicans,  Muslims  and  African
Americans,  appealing  to  more  or  less  sizeable  sections  of  a  diverse  population.
Nevertheless,  there  might  be  something  missing  here,  something  that  perhaps
provides  a  bit  more  insight  into  the  appeal  of  emergent  political  and  media
personalities such as Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, Milo Yiannopoulos, Steve Bannon
and, of course, President Trump. 
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While  the  moral  panic  thesis  might  portray  Trump  as  the  archetypal  ‘moral
entrepreneur’, as the ‘significant other’ to a nation’s political discourse, many of his
supporters seem to see him as something of a transgressive figure with a negativistic
appeal that rests, in part, on baiting his opponents and defying conventions. To put it
differently,  we  might  see  Trump  and  other  agents  of  recent  political  change  as
beneficiaries of a kind of negative ideological disbelief in the established processes of
Anglophone liberalism, appealing to a ‘transgressive sensibility’ that, 
Excuse[s] and rationalise[s] the utter dehumanization of women and ethnic
minorities… liberat[ing] their conscience from having to take seriously the
potential human cost of breaking the taboo against racial politics that has
held since WWII… [this] is the full coming to fruition of a transgressive anti-
moral style, its final detachment from any egalitarian philosophy of the left
or Christian morality of the right (Nagle, 2017: 38-9).
What we’re looking at, we might suggest, is a political project of yet another ‘new
right’ that  has  assumed  ‘the  aesthetics  of  counterculture,  transgression  and  non-
conformity’ (Ibid.  28), wielding its  ability to shock, offend and troll  its opponents
with  a  crude  and carnivalesque rejection  of  ‘political  correctness’.  Aspects  of  the
Trumpian policy base might resemble the relatively prohibitive social ethics of the
early twentieth century – the ‘global gag rule’ on abortion and family planning, for
example – but, throughout his campaign and, more recently, his presidency, he has
displayed  a  hard-bitten  capacity  to  say  and  do  almost  anything  to  win,  changing
perspective without notice, actively trolling his opponents and generally transgressing
the established rules of political office. 
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To proclaim ‘moral panic’ in relation to the Trump presidency, amongst a suite of
comparable transformations, is to fixate on one aspect of a multifaceted problem
that afflicts much of our combined political sphere. Reflecting constructionism’s
primary  concerns,  it  promises  to  elevate  the  significance  of  politicised  and
mediated narratives as foundations for active political participation whilst barely
touching upon subjective  experience within neoliberal  reality,  the diversity of
motivations within our electoral form and the jaundiced, disinterested ethos that
seems  to  have  given  rise  to  a  transgressive  sensibility.  Taken  together,  the
realities  of  political  diversity  and  electoral  absence,  along  with  the  shifting
function of ideology within processes of social  change and/or inertia perhaps
suggests  that  mass-mediated  ‘moral  panics’  are  affecting  very  few  people,  if
indeed that are affecting any at all.   
With this in mind, it is perhaps time to ‘move beyond the rhetoric of folk devils and
moral panics’ (Gadd & Jefferson, 2007: 186) by acknowledging that it might be little
more than a fearful reaction itself, “a commemoration of a fractional aetiology of past
totalitarian  horrors  in  the  liberal  imagination”  (Hall,  2012a:  137).  Our  discipline
might instead benefit from a closer approach to the seemingly permanent crisis of
insecurity  and  inequality  generated  by  global  capitalism’s  pursuit  of  profitable
investment opportunities as it runs up against the limits of finite ecological systems
(Klein, 2015). 
What we need,  to put it  simply,  is  to push beyond the transcendental idealism of
critical criminology’s established canon, especially the de facto defence of the status
quo that comes with the tacit assertion that many of our problems boil down to active
political participation on the strength of faulty information – moral panics. We need
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instead to fully and purposefully explore the destructive consequences of our cultural
and economic systems, the drives and subjectivities that lead some to cause harm in
the lives of others and/or accept it for themselves and the political policies that seem
to be worsening the situation (see Hall & Winlow, 2015).  
If  we maintain our  allegiance to  left-liberalism’s  social  reaction  paradigm,  on the
other hand, it’s entirely possible that we will eventually find ourselves on the outside
looking  in  as  others  pick  up  the  mantle  of  a  realist,  transformative  politics  that
actually attempts to meet problems head on rather than busying itself with the rather
conservative task of declaring them to be overblown and thus not worth too much
critical attention. The fundamental problem with the moral panic thesis, however, is
its  apparent  insistence  on  trying  to  mash  the  complex,  dualistic  significance  of
morality,  ideology,  concern  and  anxiety  into  a  species  of  hard-line  social
constructionism, which, as a philosophical framework, is only marginally viable if we
steadfastly ignore twenty-first century ideas. When placed alongside these ideas, even
in this relatively circumscribed form, it perhaps begins to look as though we might
need to ditch ‘moral panics’ because these concepts present a substantial challenge to
its understanding of structure, power and change in late modernity.
Conclusion
In  Forget  Foucault,  Jean  Baudrillard  (2007)  questions  the  foundations  of  his
compatriot’s  entire  conceptual  apparatus,  arguing  that  it  rests  on  a  nostalgic
invocation  of  idealised  symbolic  authority  that  no  longer  holds  much  sway  over
current  social  structures  and  processes  of  change.  Where  Foucault’s  outmoded
appreciation of social ontology relies on the suggestion that elites manage our ethical
lives  by  denouncing  difference  and  non-conformity  within  a  regulatory  structure
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aimed at the subjugation of bodies, ‘our centre of gravity… has shifted toward an
unconscious and libidinal economy’ that relies instead on ‘the total naturalisation of
desire’ (Ibid. 39). It’s idea of ‘control’ sits outside the possibility of a society that does
not  solely  seek  to  repress  desire  but  instead  combines  it  with  solicitation  so  that
libidinal  forces  internally  reproduce  the  energetic  impulse  that  forces  round  the
circulation of capital, leaving Foucault (see, for instance, 1991; 1998) with a suite of
ideas that cannot reflect clamorous demands for cultural and economic freedom. 
With  much  the  same  emphasis,  however,  the  moral  panic  thesis  remains  one  of
criminology’s most widely and frequently referenced analytical concepts with a sense
of  ecological  validity  that  draws  on the  disciplinary  sub-dominance  of  left-liberal
thought.  It too is afflicted by a zero-sum understanding of symbolic authority that
struggles to adequately reflect the dualistic, non-dialectical core of late capitalism,
affixing the critical  gaze on the possibility of indiscriminate pathologisation at  the
expense of the formation of asocial  subjectivities within peripheral spaces and the
exploitative,  anti-ethical  sense  of  entitlement  that  comes  with  cultivating  pseudo-
pacified socio-symbolic competition.
It’s thus possible that the moral panic thesis sanitises and simplifies real processes of
social  change  and  ideological  inertia,  reducing  them  to  a  slightly  conspiratorial
emphasis  on  mediated  representation,  which  it  then  transposes  into  a  series  of
distinctly problematic claims regarding the nature of power and authority, the role of
the mass media and the prevalence of ‘panic’ as opposed to apolitical anxiety and
generalised disaffection. Its insistence that audiences are taken in by different shades
of  the folk devil  metaphor,  for  instance,  flies  in  the  face  of  the era  of  ‘capitalist
realism’ and the ethos of interpassive ennui that has largely neutralised active moral
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and political engagement in favour of cynical nihilism and the transgressive allure of
an imagined, idealised past absent the global movement of people, money and goods.
If that’s the case, however, it’s possible that older ideas like moral panic no longer
help to provide criminology with the most appropriate analytical frameworks.  
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